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Figner et al. (2009) developed the Columbia Card Task (CCT) to measure risk-taking
attitudes. This tool consists of two versions: in the COLD version the decision maker
needs to state in advance how many cards (out of 32) they want to turn over (so called
static risk taking), in the HOT version they have the possibility of turning over all 32
cards one-by-one until they decide to finish (dynamic risk taking). We argue that the
HOT version confounds an individual’s willingness to accept risk with their beliefs in
trend continuation vs. trend reversal in a prognostic task. In two experimental studies we
show that people believing in trend continuation (momentum subjects) turn over more
cards than those believing in trend reversal (contrarians) in the HOT version of the task.
However, this is not the case in the COLD version. Thus, we provide evidence that, when
considered as a dynamic risk propensity measure, the number of turned over cards in
the HOT version of the CCT is a contaminated measure and reflects two phenomena: (1)
risk preference and (2) the decision-maker’s belief in trend continuation. We speculate
that other dynamic risk taking measures can also be biased by a momentum strategy.
Keywords: Columbia Card Task (CCT), dynamic risk taking, prognostic strategies, positive and negative recency,
streaks perception
Introduction
Traditional static risk taking measures such as that of Holt and Laury (2002) have limited success
in predicting individual diﬀerences in naturalistic risk-taking (Wärneryd, 1996; Kubin´ska and
Markiewicz, 2012a,b) Therefore dynamic risk taking measures have been introduced (Wallsten
et al., 2005). Dynamic risk taking occurs in situations where a decision maker faces recurring
risky opportunities and where “outcome feedback at one point in time provides information that
alters the subjective event probability prior to the next opportunity” (Wallsten et al., 2005, p. 863).
Many authors argue that such measures are much better predictors than static measures of real-
life risk taking behaviors such as drinking, smoking, or stealing (Lejuez et al., 2003, 2007). The
HOT version of the Columbia Card Task (CCT; Figner et al., 2009) is one such dynamic risk taking
measure (Dahne et al., 2013). The main aim of this study was to test whether the task confounds
measurement of risk propensity with individual beliefs in trend continuation.
In each of 64 CCT1 rounds, participant (P) sees a deck of 32 loss and gain cards face down and
characteristics of particular round: the number of loss cards (n) hidden among all remaining gain
1Listed in the Decision Making Individual Diﬀerences Inventory (DMIDI) database under the link: http://www.sjdm.org/
dmidi/ColumbiaCardTask.html (oﬃcial webpage: http://www.columbiacardtask.org).
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cards (32-n), the monetary amount associated with each loss card,
and the amount associated with the gain cards. P’s task is to turn
over cards to achieve a total gain as big as possible at the end of
the last round. What P does not know is that only nine rounds of
the game are generated by chance. The remaining 54 rounds are
rigged to let the respondents turn over 32-n cards with no loss
card appearing. Only these rigged feedback rounds are used as an
indicator of risk preference (measured as the average number of
turned over cards in all rigged 54 rounds).
Two versions of the CCT are available – HOT and COLD
(for dynamic and static risk taking measurement respectively).
Contrary to the HOT task that provides win/loss feedback after
each card is turned over and feedback on number of points after
each single round, the COLD task only provides points feedback
when P completes the entire task, all 63 rounds. In each round
of the HOT task, P points to a face-down card to turn it over
and to see its face. If the card is a gain card (a smiling face), the
gain is added to the total game balance, and then P points to the
next card. The situation involves dynamic risk taking since each
turned over gain card makes ﬁnding a loss card more probable
by restricting the pool of gain cards among a ﬁxed number of
loss cards. P can turn over cards until they decide that the risk
of turning over the next card is too high or until they encounter
the loss cards. In the COLD task, however, P does not point to
particular cards, but needs to decide in advance how many out of
the 32 cards to turn over in the particular round that is described
by the number of loss cards, loss amount, and gain amount (thus
it relates to static risk taking) Furthermore, P knows that a draw
will be made by the computer after they complete the entire task
of 63 rounds.
As shown by Loewenstein et al. (2001) immediate feedback
increases arousal on a task. By introducing immediate feedback
to the CCT HOT version the authors made it feasible to track
dynamic risk taking propensity, while the CCT COLD version
with no feedback makes it feasible to track static propensity.
Consequently Figner et al. (2009) demonstrated that the HOT
condition is associated with higher electro-dermal activity than
the COLD condition. This supports the authors’ suggestion that
deliberative, cognitive processes prevail in the COLD condition,
while aﬀective processes prevail in the HOT one.
The authors of the CCT point out that far more cards are
turned over in the HOT than in the COLD condition. Therefore
the question arises as to what may encourage a decision maker
to turn over more cards in the HOT task than the COLD
task. We believe that the number of cards turned over in the
HOT version (used as a measure of risk preference) is in fact
a confounded measure of two phenomena: risk taking and
the human propensity to follow trends. The CCT HOT task
encourages a very speciﬁc propensity: the great majority of rigged
rounds (54 out of 63) include positive feedback, therefore subject
can if fact safely turn 32-n cards in each of the rigged rounds,
getting positive feedback after turning each following cards (it is
like throwing a long sequence of wins when throwing two sided
coin with win and lose side). In several studies of animals and
humans it has been shown that individuals adopt the so called
win–stay/lose–shift (WSLS) strategy (Imhof et al., 2007; Wilke
and Barrett, 2009; Blanchard et al., 2014). This tendency may
account for the higher number of turned over cards in the HOT
condition compared to the COLD condition. At the same time, it
suggests possible contamination of the HOT task by two factors:
risk propensity and following the WSLS.
Indeed, when individuals observe a series of events in
the real word, they form strong expectations about the next
event. Research on judging sequences of binary events [see
the overview in Oskarsson et al. (2009)], both random and
nonrandom, has shown that some individuals have expectations
that a streak of events will continue (so called positive recency,
momentum or “hot hand” beliefs), while others at the same time
subjected to the same stimuli seem to believe in trend reversal
(contrarian, negative recency propensity, and gambler’s fallacy).
In these studies (e.g., Ayton and Fischer, 2004; Gronchi and
Sloman, 2008; Tyszka et al., 2008; Kubin´ska and Markiewicz,
2012c; Kubin´ska et al., 2012), Ps observing a sequence of
events are asked to make predictions about the next event.
Thus, their strategy for forecasting uncertain events can be
ascertained.
We suspected that rigged rounds feedback in the HOT
condition would encourage momentum followers (positive
recency) to collect more cards than contrarians (who would
expect trend reversal and reveal a negative recency eﬀect).
Thus the CCT HOT condition is not a pure risk propensity
measurement, but also measures an individual’s prognostic
strategy. Thus, the higher number of turned over cards by
momentum followers in the HOT condition (as compared to
contrarians) does not reﬂect their higher risk preference but
reﬂects task bias. In short, the CCT HOT version catches not
only risk taking propensity but also the “hot hand” beliefs
(Gilovich et al., 1985; Ayton and Fischer, 2004; Burns and
Corpus, 2004) popular in sports, which refers to the conviction
that a player has a higher chance of making a shot after
two or three successful shots (resulting in “streaks”). In the
same manner, by participating in many rigged feedback rounds,
the positive feedback sensitive individual (momentum decision
maker) can start to believe that they can turn over more cards
because they have a lucky (hot) hand, and or are on a streak.
Thus we hypothesized that, H1: Momentum decision makers
should turn over more cards in the CCT HOT condition than
contrarians. However, no such diﬀerence was expected in the
COLD condition.
Method – Study 1
Study 1 was conducted to verify the H1 hypothesis, which states
that momentum decision makers would turn over more cards in
the CCT HOT condition than contrarians.
Participants and Procedure
Ps were students of Cracow University of Economics, N = 256
participants (mostly females: 86%, age M = 24.46 years,
SD = 5.32). They gave their informed consent in accordance
with the APA Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of
Conduct. The study was approved by Kozminski University
ethics committee and at the end of the study participants
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were fully debriefed. Ps performed the study individually, in
front of a computer screen separated by cubicles from other
PC stations, providing privacy from other participants. The
duration of the whole procedure amounted to 42 min on
average.
Measures
The experiment was run using Inquisit by Millisecond Software.
The prognostic strategy task was programed by the ﬁrst author,
while the CCT script was downloaded from the Inquisit Task
Library (http://www.millisecond.com/download/library/).
Prognostic Strategy
Prognostic strategy use was measured by a procedure used by
Tyszka et al. (2008), often referred to as a recency test. Ps were
asked to make predictions based on observation of a randomly
generated sequence of binomial events (a two-point distribution
with equally probable values). The task instructions informed Ps
that a sequence of fair coin tosses (with equal probabilities of
head and tails) was going to be presented on the screen. The
participants were asked to observe 20 series of 10 coin tosses
(200 tosses in total). At every 10th event, Ps had to make a
prediction about the next event. Participants’ aims were to make
asmany correct predictions as possible. The sequence of binomial
events for Study 1 with circled predicted events is presented in
Figure 1.
Ps were classiﬁed post hoc into two groups: momentum (M)
and contrarian (C) decision makers, based on two crucial rounds
ending with the longest streak lasting for three events – round 17
ending with the streak of three heads and round 18 ending with
the streak of three tails (circled points in Figure 1). Respondents
anticipating trend continuation in both aforementioned rounds
were classiﬁed as momentum followers (n = 48), and those
predicting trend reversal in both rounds as contrarians (n= 110),
leaving n = 98 respondents unclassiﬁed2. All other rounds
with no streaks or streaks of two events were discarded in the
analysis as not being perceived as streaks by respondents (Carlson
and Shu, 2007) in line with previous studies (Tyszka et al.,
2008). The post hoc control analysis revealed that the M and C
groups were balanced in terms of gender (p > 0.05) however,
contrarian group members were slightly older (M = 24.34 years)
than momentum members (M = 23.10), t(149.762) = 2.146,
p< 0.05.
The Columbia Card Task
After completing the recency test, Ps were randomly assigned
to one of the two conditions, taking the CCT either in the
COLD (n = 127, 84% females) or HOT (n = 129, 87%
females) version. The control analysis revealed that participants
were balanced in terms of age and gender (p > 0.05). On
ending, participants gave socio-demographic information and
were debriefed.
Results – Study 1
On average, respondents taking part in the HOT task3 disclosed
more cards (M = 26.95; SD = 3.17) than those taking part
in the COLD task (M = 13.24; SD = 4.59), as revealed by
2Leaving respondents unclassiﬁed is intended and planned. The previous studies
(Odean, 1999) reveal that there is a group amounting to 50% of samples which
takes streaks into consideration while making prognoses. It seems that the other
half are insensitive to streaks (Scheibehenne and Studer, 2014).
3The number of turned over cards in our HOT condition participants is higher
compared to the original Figner et al. (2009) study. However, the number is similar
to that for the group of respondents aged 17–19 in the same study. We believe that
gender, educational proﬁle and cross cultural diﬀerences play a role here.
FIGURE 1 | The sequence presented to participants. Tails are coded as −1 and heads as +1 (Studies 1 and 2). Participants saw separate events one after
another, and not the whole history as presented in the chart. Red circles highlight the critical decisions for the longest sequences determining prognostic strategy.
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t-test, t(223.669) = 27.743, p = 0.001; d = 3.48. To test the
hypothesis (H1) that prognostic strategy, as measured externally
for the CCT, inﬂuences the number of turned over cards in
the HOT condition, a two-way independent factorial ANOVA
was conducted with the results presented in Figure 2. We
demonstrated a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of CCT task on the
number of turned over cards, F(1,154) = 506.71, p = 0.001,
η2 = 0.767. There was also a signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect of
CCT task and prognostic strategy on the number of turned
over cards, F(1,154) = 5.18, p = 0.024; η2 = 0.033. Prognostic
strategy inﬂuenced the number of turned over cards diﬀerently
in the COLD and HOT tasks. The observed interaction
contributes to better understanding of the CCT HOT task, since
such interactions are nowadays considered to provide major
contributions to judgment and decision making studies (Appelt
et al., 2011).
As expected, in the HOT condition momentum followers
turned over more cards than contrarians, t(80) = 2.034,
p = 0.045, Cohen’s d = 0.494, while the number of turned over
cards for contrarians and momentum followers did not diﬀer
signiﬁcantly for the COLD condition, t(74) = 1.430, p = 0.157,
d = 0.353. Thus, momentum followers turned over more cards
than contrarians in the HOT condition but not in the COLD
condition. However, the eﬀect size in the HOT task was only
moderate.
Study 2
Study 2 was conducted to test the robustness of the Study 1 results
and to verify the strength of the Study 1 eﬀect. Here, we included
another sequence in the recency task to ensure results were not
dependent upon the speciﬁc sequence in Study 1. Also, we aimed
FIGURE 2 | Study 1: the number of turned over cards in the HOT and
COLD conditions separately for momentum and contrarian
participants.
FIGURE 3 | Study 2: the number of turned over cards in the HOT CCT
separately for momentum and contrarian participants.
to recruit a more diversiﬁed sample in terms of gender (Study
1 involved a predominantly female sample). Since the Study 2
research hypothesis related only to the HOT CCT condition, the
COLD task was not utilized here.
Participants and Procedure
Sixty-ﬁve students of Kozminski University, mostly females
(60%), age M = 22.53 years (SD = 5.23), took part in the
research after giving their informed consent in accordance
with the APA Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of
Conduct. The study was approved by Kozminski University
ethics committee and at the end the study participants
were fully debriefed. The participants performed the study
individually, in front of a computer separated by cubicles
from other PC stations, providing privacy from other
participants.
Measures
The Study 1 procedure (with the whole group performing
CCT HOT only) was repeated, however, we used a new
randomly generated sequence of binary events to ensure that
results were not dependent on the speciﬁc sequence used
in Study 1. The new sequence is graphically presented in
Figure 1. Ps made their prognosis at every 10th event, and
were classiﬁed into momentum and contrarian groups based
on their decisions in the longest rounds (11th – ending with
the streak ﬁve heads, and 19th – ending with the streak
ﬁve tails). In this way we obtained a group of n = 9
contrarians (67% females) and n = 18 momentum followers
(72% females), leaving n = 38 unclassiﬁed (53% females). The
post hoc control analysis revealed that the M and C groups
were balanced in terms of gender and age (p > 0.05). At the
end of the procedure participants completed socio-demographic
questionnaires.
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Results – Study 2
In Study 2 we retested hypothesis H1, assuming that prognostic
strategy, as measured externally for the CCT, would inﬂuence
the number of turned over cards in the HOT condition.
We assumed that in the HOT condition the momentum
followers would turn over more cards than the contrarians.
To validate the results of Study 1 t-test was conducted which
showed that momentum followers turned over more cards
than contrarians [t(25) = 2.270, p = 0.032; d = 0.927]. The
result (Figure 3), with large eﬀect size this time, therefore
provides additional support for the Study 1 results and adds
signiﬁcantly to research using other recency task. The diﬀerence
between Studies 1 and 2 was the diﬀerent event sequence
used in the recency test (see Figure 1), and therefore the
results show that veriﬁcation of H1 does not depend on the
sequence used to divide people into contrarian and momentum
groups.
General Discussion
Testing of the Hypothesis
Studies 1 and 2 both supported the hypothesis that in the CCT
HOT condition momentum decision makers would turn over
more cards than contrarians. No such diﬀerence was observed
for the COLD condition. Thus, it can be concluded that the
HOT version of the CCT confounds risk attitudes and prognostic
strategy use. We believe that momentum followers, who believe
in the continuation of streaks of positive events, simply tend to
use the WSLS strategy more frequently than participants who
do not believe in the continuation of streaks. Also, the HOT
task guarantees participants long streaks of positive events (gain
cards). Thus, those believing in streak continuation (momentum
followers) turn over more cards when a streak appears than
those believing in streak reversion (contrarians) who stop the
game.
Theoretical Implications
One can speculate that a belief in the continuation of a
streak of events can also inﬂuence responses to other dynamic
risk taking tools, such as the Balloon Analogue Risk Task
(Lejuez et al., 2002; Dahne et al., 2013; Lauriola et al., 2014),
the Devil’s Task (aka Slovic’s Risk Task –(Slovic, 1966) and
others (Gardner and Steinberg, 2005; Fernandez-Duque and
Wifall, 2007; Pleskac, 2008). It is a general characteristic of
dynamic risk taking tasks that they allow repeated choices
with gradually rising small probabilities of failure. Thus,
participants experience a sequence of events, usually a long
sequence of positives, before experiencing a failure (if this is
experienced at all). As suggested by Figner et al. (2009), such
a dynamic is an important characteristic of real-world risk-
taking (e.g., driving a number of extra miles without refueling
when a fuel light ﬂashes). The question therefore arises as
to whether only certain dynamic risk taking measures (e.g.,
the CCT HOT task) confound risk with type of prognostic
strategy use, or alternatively whether the whole concept of
dynamic risk taking (Weber and Johnson, 2008) confounds
these two phenomena. The further studies should investigate
other dynamic risk taking tools to test whether they assign
higher risk taking scores to momentum followers than to
contrarians.
An Alternative Explanation
The results demonstrated that in the HOT condition momentum
followers turned over more cards than contrarians. We have
explained this by referring to the momentum characteristics
of the CCT HOT task. An alternative explanation might be
that momentum followers are willing to accept higher risks
than contrarians. However, if anything, contrarians should
reveal higher risk taking propensities than momentum followers
(Kubin´ska and Markiewicz, 2012c; Marmurek et al., 2013).
In a sequence of binomial events appearing with the same
probability, momentum followers treating the last event as a
reference point could display a status quo eﬀect (opting for
trend continuation), while contrarians might either adopt a
diﬀerent reference point, or, as less risk averse individuals,
not opt for the status quo and take an action which does
not follow the trend. Previous research has demonstrated that
contrarian investors create more risky portfolios in terms of
SD and variance (Kubin´ska and Markiewicz, 2012c), thus it
remains possible that M-C diﬀerences in risk taking propensity
exist only in the cold domain, dominated by calculated risk
taking. However, our study hasn’t detected any signiﬁcant
M-C diﬀerence in cold conditions, although the directional
change favors the hypothesis of higher risk taking propensity
among contrarians. Further research should investigate if,
and when, contrarians take more risk than momentum
followers.
Limitations
There are some possible limitations of our research. The
momentum and contrarian groups contained roughly half of
the subjects each. Therefore the claim that the CCT HOT task
confounds risk propensity with prognostic strategy use only
applies to the part of any statistical population that could be
assigned to M or C groups: the confounding nature of the
HOT task is relevant only to the part of a population that
could be assigned to such groups and is not relevant to the
part of any population that is not sensitive to trends. The fact
that only half of the sample could be classiﬁed as M or C
may result from either such a structure existing in the present
population or from shortcomings of currently used methods
for M and C classiﬁcation. The currently used method of
measuring prognostic strategy use (Tyszka et al., 2008) requires
respondents to make many choices. However, only two choices
related to the longest sequences are used to assign participants
to momentum or contrarian groups. This makes the recency
test a noisy tool, potentially misclassifying subjects (someone
not tracking the sequence can be wrongly misclassiﬁed as M or
C with p = 0.5). Nevertheless, even using a noisy classiﬁcation
tool our set of experiments supported our hypothesis. This
makes us believe that a better classiﬁcation tool would provide
even clearer evidence in favor of the hypothesis tested. Further
studies should also address the limitations of the current
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 August 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1073
Markiewicz et al. CCT and prognostic strategies
method of investigating prognostic strategies. We believe that
further research could use the Hierarchical Bayes method
(Scheibehenne and Studer, 2014) to classify decision makers
based on a whole set of decisions. In the “drift model”
introduced by Scheibehenne and Studer (2014), the probability
of predicting the same outcome for the next event to be
observed is related to the length of the last run. If there is
a positive relationship between the probability of the trend
continuation and the run length, then those respondents
are more likely to predict the continuation of a streak and
they are classiﬁed as momentum maintainers. A negative
relationship between the probability of the trend continuation
and the run length indicates that probability of predicting
the same outcome decreases with the run length and those
respondents are classiﬁed as contrarians. In the Hierarchical
Bayesian approach, the prognostic strategies classiﬁcation is
made based on the sensitivity of the respondents to the
whole trend, rather than being based on only a few arbitrary
moments.
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